The great demand of centrist politics is fiscal discipline, particularly in managing public debt. With nearly 115% of its GDP in accumulated debt, France is the ugly little duckling of European economies, with only Greece and Italy performing worse. Bayrou attempted to scare MPs into voting for the confidence vote on September 8th, describing the choice they faced as one between utter chaos, or more of the same. But MPs rejected the dichotomy—the organizing metaphor of centrism, which equates the management of state finances to managing a household budget. This is the great subterfuge of centrist economics: that one runs the state as a good paterfamilias, an austere bookkeeper responsible for disciplining his unruly wife and children.

Bayrou had been appointed to pass an austerity budget for 2025 to avoid an American-style government shutdown, which he promptly passed, thanks to the passivity of the Socialists and far Right. The size of the effort? €50 billion. It was an almost perfectly centrist budget, comprising 60% budget cuts borrowed from the Right and 40% additional taxes taken from the Left. The budget failed to improve France's finances, and further sacrifices are needed for 2026—€44 billion, this time. Bayrou promised to ask the richest in France for a contribution to this national effort, but never gave details as to what this meant. We will never know now what Bayrou had in mind to address rising inequalities. 

Bayrou had been a Macronist since the beginning, nominated in 2017 to the post of Justice Minister until he had to step down a month later due to a pending investigation into embezzlement of EU funds. To make his comeback to the forefront of the government, Bayrou used the oldest trick in the book last December. When Macron called Bayrou to say he was about to nominate Sébastien Lecornu to the post of Prime Minister, Bayrou threatened to withdraw the support of his 36 MPs if Macron did not nominate him instead. Macron caved and let Bayrou hold the reins, but now, barely a day after Bayrou losing the confidence vote in the National Assembly, Macron has nominated Lecornu. Having blackmailed his way into the position of Prime Minister, Bayrou’s centrism is to be replaced by yet another, with Lecornu being Macron’s closest ally and longest-standing minister. One can expect Lecornu to continue Macronism faithfully, tightening budgets and maintaining austerity. 

The arguments against fiscal discipline come from multiple sources, from Modern Monetary Theory in the USA to the économistes attérés [“outraged economists”] in France. These economists argue that a state cannot run out of money, since it controls the supply of money. There are alternative ways to manage large debts than austerity, such as boosting demand through public spending. States, including the French state, have survived much higher debts, proportionally, through a series of policy measures that are open to any government today. Inflation could reduce the size of the debt, partial cancellation (the famous “haircut”) could consolidate some of the debt acquired in times of emergency, and one-off taxes could be used to reimburse parts of the debt. Bayrou’s scare tactics underscore the lack of imagination among the French political class.

This is the primary danger of centrism: not that it fails to satisfy anyone by attempting to compromise with everyone, but that it lacks the imagination to find new and better ways of acting in the national interest. Repeating the same process ad aeternitatem and expecting a different result is, after all, the definition of insanity. Bayrou conceived of the French people as in a Sisyphean situation: eternally condemned to making more and more austerity efforts, year after year. Macron, to his credit, attempted to break the cycle when he came to power in 2017, advocating for a clear direction that would propel France out of its downward spiral. He opted for a France of entrepreneurs, lowering taxes on dividends to a flat rate, making France more attractive to the wealthy. Deficits were stable at first, but the gamble did not pay off. The virtuous trickle-down of wealth from the top to the bottom has not occurred, and budget deficits from 2020 on led Macron to push for austerity as the new normal, cutting spending on pensions, health, and education. Imagining a different way of doing politics will require the renegotiation of a social contract between the governed and their rulers. 

This will not be an easy task. It will require political vision, leadership, and a disregard for the existing rules of the game. Centrism is incapable of delivering in this regard, as it seeks to “compromise” between the Left and the Right but in truth to give neither what they want. But every political path out of the current French deadlock will require a change of course, and for the population to buy into the change. The three primary forces in French politics today—the Center, the far Right, and the Left—have each failed to articulate such a vision. What is needed is a political vision that offers benefits to citizens for the sacrifices they will make. The Left’s Green New Deal, for example, will only be effective if it provides a clear vision for the social body to thrive. Thus far, the Left has failed to make the case for such a project, and so it seems in the public imaginary more like austerity than a vision of a people assembled, wherein the dream of flying cars has been set aside in favor of slower travel, deteriorating public infrastructure, and low-emission zones that restrict people’s access to urban centers. 

The French Fifth Republic is clearly tired, with members of the Presidential camp joining calls for constitutional reform. A Sixth Republic will only provide a new way forward if it enables citizens, from all walks of life, to participate and shape their collective future. France once led the way for democratic institutions, but no longer inspires others to follow in its footsteps. A renewal of democratic institutions is required, but it will need to be shaped boldly, not through a centrist compromise, but through a vision for politics in the twenty-first century. Representative institutions will need to involve citizens more actively than through the simple process of voting every few years. With Bayrou out of the way, and Macron at an all-time low in opinion polls (barely 15% approval), the path may be open for a new movement to create fresh opportunities, far away from the centrists. 

Bayrou has at least managed to foster public debate in reaction to his politics, as the social movement of “bloquons tout” [block everything] shows. Around 200,000 citizens took to the streets of France, demanding social justice and increased democracy. Initially called for by groups close to the far Right, it was quickly made much broader and joined by trades unions and the left Nouvelle Union Populaire parties. It was an anti-centrist movement par excellence, galvanized around a vision that refuses the Macronist compromise. Reminiscent of the gilets jaunes, this social movement against Macron 2.0 scared the government, which in turn mobilized 80,000 police and gendarmerie officers, including the deployment of armored personnel carriers with mounted machine guns in front of government buildings. The people are demanding a seat at the table, and a great leader will envision a place for them to participate in politics.

Charles Devellennes is Senior Lecturer in Political and Social Thought at the University of Kent, and the author of the Macron Régime and The Gilets Jaunes and the New Social Contract.